An important unanswered question in the empirical literature on trust is whether trusting begets trustworthiness.
The trustee in the standard Trust Game knows that she is trusted, whereas the trustee in the Faith Game does not know whether she is trusted or not. Except for this fact, the trustee faces the same choice in both situations. If the simple fact that one is trusted by someone else makes her more trustworthy to the truster, then the trustee in the Trust Game should behave in a more trustworthy manner. The results of our experiment indicate that trust does not beget trustworthiness, at least in one-shot games. The results also indicate that trust and trustworthiness are not two sides of the same coin, providing a partial replication of the recent findings of Buchan, Croson, and Dawes (2002) . American trusters were more trusting than their Japanese counterparts in the Trust Game, whereas American trustees were less trustworthy than were the Japanese under the same circumstances. The nationality difference in trust and trustworthiness is less pronounced in the Faith Game. We conclude that trust researchers should consider the limitations of one-shot games for the study of the emergence of trust and the determinants of trustworthiness.
Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness? Trust and Trustworthiness in Two Games and Two Cultures: A Research Note
Most scholars as well as ordinary citizens believe that trust is important as a lubricant of social relations. Beyond acknowledging the importance of trust in social and personal life, however, there is not much consensus concerning the specific nature of trust and its functions in society. A key distinction typically overlooked in the general literature concerning trust is the distinction between the trust exhibited by a truster and the trustworthiness of a trustee. As Hardin (2002) points out, trust and trustworthiness are frequently confounded in many of the writings on trust. In fact, the term "trust" is often used to refer to trustworthiness-a characteristic of a trustee--the one who is trusted. For example, when people talk about a "decline in trust in American society," they are usually referring to the fact that Americans are now perceived to behave in a less trustworthy manner than at some time in the past. At the same time, the term trust is often used also to refer to trust or trustfulness, sometimes conceived as a psychological trait of the truster (not a characteristic or trait of the trustee).
In addition, psychological scales used as indicators of trust (e.g., Rotter 1971 ) are supposed to measure individual differences in the degree or level of expecting others to be trustworthy.
The actual nature of the relationship between trust and trustworthiness has escaped the empirical attention of many trust researchers due to this tendency to confound these two concepts in theory as well as in research. In this study, we focus on the distinction between trust and trustworthiness and we address the question of whether or not the fact that a trustee is trusted makes the former behave in a more trustworthy manner. In short, does the act of trust beget trustworthiness?
Recent experimental studies provide evidence that under certain conditions people "trust" or take a risk on anonymous others, and that those who are trusted in this way honor the trust bestowed upon them even in one-shot games in which such trusting and trustworthy behavior cannot produce future benefits (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Buchan, Croson and Dawes 2002; Cox 2001 Cox , 2002 Kiyonari and Yamagishi 1999; McCabe & Smith 2000; Wang and Yamagishi 2004) . A typical experimental paradigm for studying trust involves the Trust Game (Kreps 1990) . The Trust Game is played by two players, a truster (often called a proposer) and a trustee (called a responder). The truster is given a choice between trusting (T) and not trusting (NT). If she chooses not to trust, she receives a fixed amount of money, say $10, directly from the experimenter. The trustee also receives $10 if the truster chooses not to trust. The choice of trust, on the other hand, transfers the power to choose the outcome to the trustee. In this case, the trustee is then provided with a choice between honoring (H) and not honoring (NH) the trust placed in her. The personal gain of choosing NH is greater than that of choosing H for the trustee. For example, the trustee receives $30 when he chooses NH and only $20 when he chooses H. The truster receives nothing when the trustee chooses NH, and $20 when she chooses H. The standard game theoretic logic of backward induction predicts that the trustee will choose NH, since it provides her with more money, and that the truster, knowing this fact that not honoring trust (NH) is the rational choice for the trustee, will choose not to trust (NT). This means the truster is expected not to trust the trustee and the trustee is expected not to honor the trust placed in her. Despite these game-theoretic predictions, the results of experimental studies using the Trust Game and related games such as the Investment Game (Berg et al. 1995) or the Faith Game (Kiyonari and Yamagishi 1999) have consistently revealed that a substantial proportion of trusters choose to trust, and, when trusted, a substantial proportion of the trustees honor the trust placed in them by behaving in a trustworthy manner.
DOES TRUST BEGET TRUSTWORTHINESS?
The Trust Game briefly introduced above seems to provide clear-cut behavioral evidence of trust and its relationship with trustworthiness. Upon closer scrutiny, however, it is not clear what the Trust Game actually measures for two reasons. First, the trustee who chooses to honor trust (H) may be responding to (or reciprocating) the trust placed in her, or may be behaving simply in a fair or altruistic manner. That is, the trustee's choice of H may be the reciprocation of trust, or it may be an expression of her concerns for altruism or fairness. Similarly, the choice of T (trust) by the truster may be based on the expectation of reciprocation of her trust or the expectation of the altruistic and fairness concerns of the trustee. Second, it is also possible that the choice of T by the truster may simply be based on her own altruistic motives; that is, she might be motivated to give the trustee an opportunity to earn more money. Sorting out what is at stake is important to understanding the role of trust and trustworthiness in social relations.
Experimental researchers have tried to answer the question of whether or not being trusted by someone makes the trusted more trustworthy by attempting to discern the motivational bases of the truster's and trustee's choices in the Trust Game. Berg et al. (1995) , for example, examined the correlation between the amount the truster entrusted to the trustee and the proportion of that amount the trustee sent back to the truster using a variant of the Trust Game called the "Investment Game." In the Trust Game described above, the choices of the truster (T and NT) and the trustee (H and NH) are binary. In the Investment Game, both choices are continuous. The truster decides how much of her endowment of $X to entrust to the trustee. The amount of money entrusted (say, $Y, where 0 ≤ Y ≤ X) is tripled and transferred to the trustee. The trustee receives both his own endowment of $X and the money entrusted to him by the truster (i.e., $3Y). The trustee is then asked to send any amount $Z to the truster (where 0 ≤ Z ≤ X+3Y). Berg and his colleagues reason that the proportion of the endowment of $X entrusted to the trustee (Y/X) is a behavioral measure of how much the truster trusts the recipient.
Similarly, the proportion of the money the responder sends back to the truster (Z/(3Y)) is assumed to be a measure of the trustee's trustworthiness. They then examined whether the two ratios (or proportions) are correlated, reasoning that if the correlation is zero, then the trustee's decision is not affected at all by how much he is trusted by his partner. In other words, a correlation of zero indicates that the trustee does not reciprocate the trust bestowed on him by the truster and, the fact that the trustee is trusted by the truster does not affect how altruistic and fair he has behaved toward the truster. If the trustee reciprocates the trust bestowed on him, there should be a positive correlation between the two ratios. Berg and his colleagues did not find a significant correlation between these ratios.
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Another study by Snijders and Keren (1999) with a similar design also failed to find a positive correlation. Dufenberg and Gneezy (2000) used a slightly different methodology to tease out the effect of reciprocity on the trustee's behavior. The truster in their study decides between T (letting the trustee split 20 guilders between the two of them) and NT (having X guilders directly provided by the experimenter, where X < 20). The trustee then gives Y guilders to the truster and takes the rest (20 -Y) for himself. They reason that the positive correlation between X (the money the truster gives up in order to let the responder have a chance to split 20 guilders) and Y (the money the trustee pays back to the truster) reflects the trustee's reciprocity motive. They did not find a positive correlation between X and Y. In all of these studies the answer to the question of whether the mere fact of being trusted makes one behave in a trustworthy manner toward the truster is negative. The correlations between how strongly the trustee is trusted by the truster and the trustee's willingness to reward the truster also do not indicate a significant role for reciprocity in trust relations as examined in these experimental settings. The findings thus suggest that the mere fact of being trusted by someone (i.e. having someone entrust something to you) does not make you more willing to honor that trust especially in standard one-shot games.
A different correlation-the correlation between how much the trustee thinks the truster expects to receive and how much the trustee actually gives to the truster-may be more indicative of the operation of reciprocity in trust. This expectation and the actual behavior are found to be positively correlated (Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000) . The Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) study indicates that the trustee does not reciprocate the trust placed in him, but does respond instead to the truster's perceived expectations. This expectation-behavior correlation may be the result of "projection" on the part of the trustee.
The trustees who are more altruistic and more concerned with fairness think others have similar concerns and thus expect the trustee to behave accordingly. On the other hand, the correlation may indicate that the trustee reciprocates trust only when that behavior is interpreted as an expression of the truster's actual level of trust. Thus, it is only when the trustee thinks she is being trusted because the truster expects her to be trustworthy that this act of perceived trust motivates the trustee to behave in a trustworthy manner.
An alternative strategy to tease out the effect of reciprocity on trust involves comparing results from the Trust Game with the Dictator Game (Camerer and Thaler 1995) . The trustee in the Trust Game and the "dictator" in the Dictator Game face the same behavioral choice of dividing a fixed endowment of $Z between himself and another player (i.e., the truster) anyway he prefers to. The difference between the two games lies in how the endowment of $Z is provided to the trustee or the dictator. To make the contrast clear, let us use a concrete example in which $Z is $30. In the Trust Game, the truster has a choice between T (letting the trustee divide $30 between the two of them) and NT (giving each $10). The trustee is thus given a chance to actually earn more than $10 based on the choice made by the truster. In contrast, the dictator in the Dictator Game is given the same chance of earning more than $10 directly from the experimenter; thus, the dictator owes nothing to the other party (i.e., the recipient). Except for the fact that the recipient in the Trust Game owes the truster the chance to gain extra money while the dictator owes nothing to the recipient in the Dictator Game, the two players-the trustee and the dictator-face exactly the same choice of freely dividing a fixed sum of money ($30) between themselves and another party (either the "truster" or the "recipient"). Thus, the difference in the amount the trustee or the dictator gives to the truster (i.e., the recipient) should reflect the effect of reciprocity on the degree of trust or altruism exhibited by the truster. Dufenberg and Gneezy (2000) used this specific comparison of games and found no significant difference in the amount given to the other party by the trustee in the Trust Game and the dictator in the Dictator Game. Cox (2001) uses a similar logic when he compares the following two conditions. Condition A is the standard Investment Game in which the truster decides how much of her endowment to entrust, and the trustee decides how much of the money entrusted to him to return to the truster. Condition C is equivalent to the Dictator Game, in which a "dictator" is given some amount of money directly by the experimenter. The recipient in condition C has no choice of how much to entrust. The amount that the experimenter gives to the recipient in condition C is three times the amount a matched truster in condition A actually entrusts to his or her partner. The trustee in condition A knows that she has been given a chance to improve her earnings by the choice of the truster, whereas the dictator in condition C knows that she owes nothing to the recipient. Besides how the endowment is provided, the actual choice given to the trustee in the Trust Game is the same as that provided the dictator in the Dictator Game in this experiment. Cox (2001) found that responders in condition A gave more to the truster than did the dictator in condition C, implying that the fact that one is trusted makes the trustee reciprocate by behaving in a trustworthy manner. This result was replicated among males, but not females, in a subsequent study by Cox (2002) using the same procedures.
Empirical findings concerning the question of whether or not the simple fact that one is trusted by someone makes him behave in a more trustworthy manner are mixed. That is, whether one reciprocates the trust bestowed on you by behaving in a trustworthy manner remains an unanswered question. We do not yet have a clear, unambiguous answer to this fundamental question in the trust literature. On the one hand, how much a truster entrusts to a trustee is not correlated with how much of the entrusted money is returned to the truster (Berg et al. 1995; Dufwenberg and Gneezy 2000; Snijders and Keren, 1999) .
On the other hand, Game are also mixed. The truster was shown to behave in a more trustworthy manner than the dictator in Cox (2001) and among male trustees in Cox (2002) . But, there was no significant difference between the behavior of the trustee in the Trust Game and the dictator in the Dictator Game in studies by Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000) and Snijders and Keren (1999) , or among female trustees in Cox's study (2002) . How can these findings be interpreted more generally?
DO TRUSTERS EXPECT THEIR TRUST TO BEGET TRUSTWOTHINESS?
Whether or not expectations of reciprocity play a role in the decision of the truster has received even less attention empirically. In part this is because the recipient in the Dictator
Game has no choice, thus comparison of the Trust Game and the Dictator Game cannot be used to address this question. Cox (2001 Cox ( , 2002 used an ingenious design to examine how important expectations of reciprocity were in the truster's decision by adding another condition, condition B, to his experiments. In this condition, the truster is given the same choice as in condition A. However, the trustee has no option to send back money to the truster.
Thus, the truster in this condition cannot expect a "return" on his trust; and the expectation of reciprocity therefore cannot play a role in the truster's decision in this condition. Any amount of her endowment that a truster in this condition transfers to her trustee must be based on altruism. The trustee receives three times the amount the truster transfers.
Cox (2001) found an interesting difference between conditions A and B. Trusters in condition A transferred more of their endowment to their trustees than did trusters in condition B. However, the same difference was not replicated in Cox (2002) . Besides the inconsistency between the two studies, we find that Cox's ingenious design, unfortunately, cannot provide clear evidence concerning the role of expectations of reciprocal trust due to a significant methodological problem. The difficulty is that the actual amount the truster in condition B transfers to the trustee increases the inequality of earnings between the two players. Thus, any unwillingness on the part of the truster to transfer some of her endowment to her trustee can be attributed to the operation of inequity aversion Fischbacher 2003, 2004; Fehr and Gachter 2000) . If this is the case, the difference between conditions A and B, when it exists at all, may be caused by inequity avoidance in condition B as well as by the operation of expectations of reciprocity in condition A. There is a potential solution to this confound.
THE TRUST GAME AND THE FAITH GAME
The first goal of the current study is to examine: (1) whether or not the expectation of reciprocity plays a role in a truster's decision to transfer some of his or her endowment to a trustee, and (2) The Faith Game differs from the Dictator Game only in the choice provided the truster.
Remember that the recipient in the Dictator Game has no choice. She is at the mercy of the dictator. The truster in the Faith Game is informed that the trustee is playing a dictator's role.
And yet, the truster in the Faith Game differs from the recipient in the Dictator Game in that she can choose between taking the sure $10 and receiving whatever amount the trustee gives her out of $30. In this sense, the role of the truster in the Faith Game is similar to the role of the truster in the Trust Game. However, the trustee in the Faith Game is not informed of the fact that the truster has this choice, and the truster in the Faith Game knows that the trustee is unaware of the truster's choice. From the point of view of the trustee, then, the Faith Game is identical to a Dictator Game. The difference between the two games in the behavior of the trustee thus represents the effect of reciprocity in trustworthiness on the part of the trustee. In this way, the comparison of these two games is equivalent to the comparison between the Trust Game and the Dictator Game discussed earlier.
At the same time, the comparison between these two games can provide an answer to the question whether expectations of reciprocity play a role in the level of trust of the truster.
The truster is expected to choose T instead of NT when she expects that the trustee will give her more than $10 in either condition (or when the truster is altruistically motivated and willing to reward the trustee at some cost to herself). In the Faith Game the only logical reason for the truster to expect the trustee to give her more than $10 is if the trustee is expected to be altruistic or concerned with fairness. In the Trust Game, however, the truster has an additional reason to expect the trustee to reciprocate the trust she bestows upon the trustee. Any difference in the frequencies of trust choices between trusters in the Faith Game and those in the Trust Game should thus be attributable to this additional reason-i.e., to the expectation that the trustee will reciprocate the truster's trust. The comparison of the Trust Game with the Faith Game thus provides us opportunities to simultaneously test the effect of reciprocity on the trustee's trustworthy behavior and of the expectations of reciprocity on the truster's trust behavior.
CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
The second purpose of the current study is to replicate the cross-cultural difference in trust and trustworthiness that Buchan, Croson, and Dawes (2002) found between American and Japanese participants. Buchan and her colleagues conducted an Investment Game in the US, Japan, China, and Korea, and found that trust (the truster's choice) and trustworthiness (the trustee's choice) are not two sides of the same coin; they may be orthogonal to each other under some conditions. That is, the countries that are high on trust (US and China) are not necessarily high on trustworthiness (Korea and China), and vice versa. Specifically, they found that Americans are high on trust but low on trustworthiness. Japanese are low on both.
Chinese are high on both. Koreans are low on trust and high on trustworthiness. Wang & Yamagishi (2004) and Kiyonari, Foddy, and Yamagishi (2004) Interestingly, this order is completely reversed in the Faith Game; Australians are the most trusting group (54.8% trusting), followed by the Japanese (50% trusting). The Chinese are the least trusting group (40.3% trusting).
In another study comparing American and Japanese trusters and trustees, Kiyonari and Yamagishi (1999) used the Faith Game and the Trust Game. Their results concerning the truster's behavioral choice is consistent with Buchan and her colleagues'; Americans are more trusting than are the Japanese. On the other hand, they found that Americans and Japanese are not different in the levels of trustworthiness demonstrated by the trustee. These cross-cultural studies of trust and trustworthiness (Buchan et al. 2002; Kiyonari and Yamagishi 1999; Wang and Yamagishi, 2004; Kiyonari et al. 2004) point to the need to use multiple games in comparing trust and trustworthiness cross-culturally since different psychological bases of trust and trustworthiness associated with different games may be activated in various cultures.
We thus compare American and Japanese truster's as well as trustee's choices in the Trust Game, and examine if Buchan and her colleagues' findings concerning the US-Japan comparison are replicated. Further, we examine if the US-Japan differences in the Trust
Game can be replicated in the Faith Game.
GENDER DIFFERENCES IN TRUST AND TRUSTWORTHINESS
The third purpose of this study is to examine gender differences in the role that reciprocity plays in trust and trustworthiness. Previous findings have been mixed. Cox (2002) found that male trustees reciprocate trust, while female trustees do not. Consistent with this finding, Wang and Yamagishi (2004) found, in an experiment with Chinese participants, that only male trustees reciprocate trust. In their experiment, female trusters displayed expectations of "reverse reciprocity"; they trusted the trustee more in the Faith Game than in the Trust Game. Wang and Yamagishi (2004) explain this gender difference in terms of a differential preference for risk between the two genders. That is, women are afraid that
showing their willingness to trust someone invites the trustee to exploit them, whereas the same act of trust leads men to expect reciprocal behavior from the trustee. The pattern observed by Wang and Yamagishi (2004) , including the expectations of reverse reciprocity, is replicated by Kiyonari, Foddy, and Yamagishi (2004) with Japanese and Australian participants. Unfortunately, both Wang and Yamagishi (2004) and Kiyonari et al. (2004) examined only the truster's behavior in the Faith Game and the Trust Game. Their experiments involved no real trustee. If Wang and Yamagishi's interpretation of the gender difference is valid, there should be no sex difference in the behavior of the trustee in the Faith
Game since the trustee in the Faith Game is a dictator who has the complete control of her own fate as well as the truster's fate. Thus she does not need to fear her partner. To determine the same sex difference observed by Wang and Yamagishi (2004) and Kiyonari and her colleagues (2004) exists among trustees constitutes the third purpose of the current study.
METHOD
The experiment was conducted in Japan and the United States, with 134 Japanese and 128 American participants, respectively. Fifty-two of the Japanese participants were assigned the role of trustee and eighty-two were assigned the role of truster. In the US, fifty-six participants were assigned the role of trustee and seventy-two were assigned the role of truster.
The Faith Game and the Trust Game
Participants were randomly assigned the role of truster or the role of trustee. We call the dictator in the Faith Game "trustee" in the remainder of this article to avoid having to refer to the player who divides the endowment by different names-trustee versus dictator-depending on the game. In either game, the trustees divided $30 any way they preferred. The truster chose between the sure $10 (provided directly by the experimenter) or whatever amount the trustee was to give them out of a $30 endowment. Details of the two game conditions are provided below.
The Faith Game. This game is played by two participants who have not met before. It is a one-shot game, and thus each player makes a decision just once. The participants' decisions are completely anonymous. They do not meet with each other in person before, during, or after the experiment. Their decisions are concealed in envelopes so their decisions are anonymous not only to each other, but also to the experimenter who conducts their study.
A different experimenter who sits in the control room and who never sees the participants is the only one who has the chance to learn about their decisions. The participant who is randomly assigned to the role of a "dictator" (simply called "player B" in the instructions) is provided with $30 (2,400 yen in Japan) by the experimenter, and is asked to divide the money any way he or she prefers between him-or herself and the other participant, the "truster"
(called "player A" in the instructions). The trustee is provided with the opportunity to freely divide $30 regardless of the choice of the truster. The participant who has been assigned the role of truster is first instructed about the role of the trustee or the dictator, and is offered a choice between receiving whatever amount the dictator might allocate to him or her (T) and receiving $10 directly from the experimenter. When the truster makes this choice, he or she is told that the dictator does not know that the truster has the safe option of choosing $10.
(The dictator in fact does not know about the safe option.) Furthermore, the trustee receives whatever amount he or she allocates to him-or herself regardless of the choice of the truster.
That is, the truster's choice does not affect the trustee's earnings; it affects only the truster's own earnings. The truster makes this choice before learning how much the dictator has allocated to him or her.
The Trust Game. As with the Faith Game, the Trust Game is played by two participants.
It is also a one-shot game. And, as in the Faith Game, the truster makes a binary choice between T and NT. The most important difference between the two games is that the trustee is provided with an opportunity to freely divide $30 only when the truster chooses T. The trustee knows about this choice of the truster and the fact that he or she is provided with a chance of dividing $30 (2,400 yen in Japan) when and only when the truster chooses to trust (T). When the truster chooses NT, both the truster and the trustee receive $10 each. All of the participants who had been assigned the role of trustee were told that the truster in their pair had chosen T. Thus, all of the trustees believed that their partner (the truster) had given them a chance to divide $30 (even when the truster had really chosen NT).
As discussed earlier, different motivational bases in the two games affect trust and trustworthiness. The truster's choice of T in the Faith Game is based on the expectation of altruism or fairness on the part of the trustee; the truster cannot logically expect reciprocity from the trustee for choosing T instead of NT. The truster's choice of T in the Trust Game, on the other hand, can be based on the expectation of reciprocity in addition to the expectation of altruism or fairness of the responder. In the same vein, how much the trustee gives to the truster should be based only on his or her altruism or fairness concerns in the Faith Game, since the trustee owes nothing to the truster. The trustee's behavior in the Trust Game can also be based on his or her motivation to reciprocate trust and the favor bestowed on him or her by the truster, in addition to his or her altruism or fairness concerns. Thus, the greater trust and trustworthiness expected in the Trust Game over the Faith Game represents the added effect of reciprocity.
Design of the experiment and experimental procedures
A 2 (game structure: Trust Game vs. Faith Game) x 2 (participants' nationality:
American participants vs. Japanese participants) x 2 (gender: male vs. female) factorial design was used. All three factors are between-subjects factors. The participants were recruited from each respective student body (Hokkaido University in Japan and Stanford University in the United States) for the prospect of earning money. No class credit was offered to the participants.
Procedures. Four to six students were scheduled for the same experimental session.
Upon arrival at the laboratory, each participant was immediately led to his or her room without meeting the other participants. The participant stayed in his or her room throughout the experiment. To secure anonymity from the experimenter who meets him or her in person, the participant was provided an ID card with an ID number written on it upon arrival at the laboratory. The participant picked a card from a box and kept it to herself. She was instructed before picking up the card not to show the ID number to the experimenter. The experiment was conducted with a set of envelopes delivered to the participants in sequence.
When an envelope is delivered, the participant opens it and enters his or her choice, when necessary, on a decision sheet, places the instructions and the decision sheet inside the envelope, seals it, and places it in a box outside her room. The experimenter picks up the envelope and delivers another envelope in sequence. Another experimenter who sits in the control room opens the envelope. This process was repeated several times as described below.
Envelope 1. When all the scheduled participants arrive, each participant receives the first envelope containing instructions describing the outline of the experiment, the rules of the game, and which role the participant has been assigned.
Envelope 2. When all the participants finish reading the instructions, they receive the second envelope the contents of which vary with game condition and the role they are assigned. Trusters in the Faith Game are asked whether they want to receive whatever amount the dictator gives them or take the sure $10 from the experimenter. Trusters in the Trust Game choose whether they want to let the responder divide $30 (2,400 yen in Japan) or take the sure $10 from the experimenter. Trustees in the Faith Game are asked to divide $30 any way they like between themselves and the truster. Trustees in the Trust Game are informed that the truster is making a decision between letting him or her divide $30 or taking the sure $10, and then are asked to predict which choice the truster will make. These choices (or their predictions) are written on either a decision-sheet or a prediction-sheet, whichever is relevant.
The participants place their decision (or prediction) sheets in their envelopes. When this is done, the experimenter collects the envelope containing either a decision-sheet or a prediction-sheet.
Envelope 3. In a few minutes, the third envelope is delivered to each participant. Envelope 4. The fourth (and the last) envelope contains the post-experimental questionnaire. When a participant fills out the questionnaire, the fourth envelope is collected with the questionnaire in it. Then, the participant is paid 3 and debriefed.
RESULTS

Does Trust Beget Trustworthiness?
Does the simple fact of being trusted by someone make the trusted behave in a trustworthy manner toward the truster? The results of our experiment provide a negative answer to this question, consistent with the results of most of the previous studies (Berg et al. 1995; Buchan et al. 2002; Defenberg and Gneezy 2000) . The effect of reciprocity should be represented by the difference in the amounts that trustees give to their partners in the Trust
Game and in the Faith Game. The difference in the amount (i.e., the proportion of the endowment of $30) the trustee gave to the truster was in fact larger in the Faith Game than in the Trust Game-a pattern opposite to the predicted effect of reciprocity. Trustees in the Trust Game, on average, gave 33.0% (sd = 19.6) of the $30 (or 2,400 yen) to the truster, whereas they gave 39.3% (sd = 16.4) in the Faith Game. The main effect of game (Faith Game vs. Trust Game) in the game structure × participant's nationality × participant's gender ANOVA was marginally significant, F(1, 100) = 3.57, p < .07. The reverse reciprocity observed previously by Wang & Yamagishi (2004) and Kiyonari et al. (2004) among trustees was also found in this experiment. It was demonstrated in the behavior of the trustee rather than that of the truster.
The mean proportions of $30 (or 2,400 yen) provided by the trustee shown in Table 1 indicate that reverse reciprocity exists only among the American trustees. Japanese trustees gave about the same amount of money to the truster in the Trust Game (38.5%, sd = 17.6) as in the Faith Game (39.0%, sd = 16.0). In contrast, American trustees gave much less to the truster in the Trust Game (27.3%, sd = 20.2) than in the Faith Game (39.5%, sd = 17.0), and those who chose T $15 (1,200 yen in Japan), which is half of $30. Those who chose the sure $10 received $10 (or 800 yen in Japan). Trustees were paid the amount they allocated to themselves.
the difference is significant, t(54) = 2.46, p < .05. A nationality x game structure x gender analysis of variance shows that the nationality × game structure interaction effect (F(1, 100) = 2.81, p < .10) is marginally significant. In addition, the main effect of gender was found to be marginally significant (F(1, 100) = 3.38, p < .07). No other effects were statistically significant. Table 1 About Here Table 2 shows the proportion of the trustees who gave a fair amount-that is, half or more of their endowment-to their partners. The difference in proportions between trustees in the Faith Game and those in the Trust Game is more pronounced in Table 2 than in Table 1, especially among American participants. The proportion of fair trustees in the Japanese sample is slightly larger in the Trust Game (53.6%) than in the Faith Game (45.8%), although the difference is not significant, χ
2
(1) = 0.31, ns. On the other hand, the same proportion of fair trustees among the Americans is much smaller in the Trust Game (22.2%) than in the Faith Game (62.1%), and the difference is significant, χ
(1) = 9.07, p < .01. In a logistic regression analysis of the proportion of fair trustees, the nationality x game structure interaction is significant, χ 2 (1) = 6.43, p < .01. Other effects including gender are not statistically significant.
The overall conclusions from these analyses are: (a) there is no difference between the two games among Japanese trustees, and (b) there is reverse reciprocity among American trustees. A similar reverse reciprocity was observed in earlier studies by Wang & Yamagishi (2004) and Kiyonari and her colleagues (2004) , but their studies involved only trusters. The current experiment is the first to show reverse reciprocity among the trustees. Table 2 About Here
The reverse reciprocity among American participants also seems to be reflected in the correlation between the amount the trustee gave to the truster and the estimation of the truster's expectation concerning that amount. The correlation is negative (r = -.34, p < .08) among American trusters in the Trust Game, while the negative correlation is much smaller (r = -.13, ns.) among those in the Faith Game. This suggests reverse reciprocity in the sense that American responders actually gave less when they thought their partner was expecting more.
This negative correlation was not observed among Japanese trustees. Instead, Japanese trustees gave more when they thought their partner was expecting more (r = .32, p < .10).
This correlation is positive and much stronger in the Faith Game (r =.71, p < .0001).
Do Trusters Expect Their Trust to be Reciprocated?
Comparison of the trust choices of trusters in the two games should give us an answer to the question whether the expectation of reciprocity plays a role in the truster's decision to trust. As shown in Table 3 , the proportion of trust choices by the truster is slightly higher in the Trust Game than in the Faith Game, especially among the American participants. Among Japanese trusters, the trust choice is 59.0% in the Trust Game and 60.5% in the Faith Game.
Among American trusters, the trust choice is 72.7% in the Trust Game and 64.1% in the Faith Game. The difference is not significant either among Japanese trusters or among American trusters. In a logistic regression analysis, neither the main effect of the game structure, χ 2 (1) = 0.30, ns., or the nationality x game interaction, χ
2
(1) = 0.49, ns., is statistically significant.
The trust choice in the Trust Game is higher among American participants (72.7%) than among Japanese participants (59.0%), consistent with Buchan and her colleagues' (2002) finding. However, the difference is not significant, χ 2 (1) = 1.49, ns. No other effects in the logistic regression are statistically significant. Table 3 About Here
Are the Japanese Less Trusting Than Americans?
Using an Investment Game, Buchan and her colleagues (2000) found that American trusters are more trusting than their Japanese counterparts while the two groups are equivalent concerning trustees' trustworthiness (the proportion of the entrusted money the trustees return to the trusters). Similarly, Kiyonari & Yamagishi (1999) , using the Faith Game, found a similar pattern; American trusters are more trusting than their Japanese counterparts, whereas trustees' behavior is equivalent among the American and Japanese participants. Our results are largely consistent with the previous findings concerning the U.S.-Japan comparison in the truster's behavior. In the Trust Game, 72.7% of the Americans made the trust choice and 59.0% of their Japanese counterparts made the same choice, although the difference is not significant. On the other hand, American trustees were found to be less trustworthy than their Japanese counterparts. American responders gave only 27.3% of their endowment to their partners, whereas Japanese responders gave 38.5% of their endowment to their partners. This difference is significant, t(53) = 2.21, p < .05. Overall, American participants in the Trust Game tend to be more trusting and less trustworthy than their Japanese counterparts. The nationality difference is less pronounced in the Faith Game. The proportion of the trustees in the Faith Game who chose the trust option was about the same among Americans (64.1%) and Japanese (60.5%) participants. American trustees gave 39.5%
of their endowment to trusters in the Faith Game, as did their Japanese counterparts (39.0%).
Difference by Gender
Gender does not have a statistically significant main effect on the truster's choice or a significant interaction effect with the game structure or the participant's nationality. Wang & Yamagishi's (2004) finding that males are more trusting in the Trust Game and less trusting in the Faith Game than females was not replicated. Females are more trustworthy than males in both games, though the effect of gender on the trustee's behavior is only marginally significant. Furthermore, gender does not interact with nationality or game structure. Finally, gender does not have any effect on the truster's choice.
Discussion
Two general conclusions can be drawn from the results of our experiment. First, trust is not a simple reflection of trustworthiness. This is especially apparent among American participants in this study who are rather high in trust and are fairly low in trustworthiness.
Furthermore, American participants gave less when their partner gave them the option to divide the money (as in the Trust Game) than when the participants believed that dividing the money was not decided by their partner (as in the Faith Game). As we discuss below, this sort of reverse reciprocity indicates that the one-shot act of trusting someone (and thereby taking a risk) does not necessarily lead the other person to act in a trustworthy manner on a single decision.
The second general conclusion is that subtle differences in the game structure can have a large impact on the player's choices. We started with the assumption that the trustee in the Trust Game has an extra motivational basis for choosing to trust than the dictator in the Dictator Game for which altruism and fairness concerns are the only motivational basis for behaving in a fair manner toward the truster. This assumption of "cumulative" motivations is rejected on the basis of the American trustee's behavior. They behaved in a fairer manner in the Faith Game than in the Trust Game. This pattern cannot be explained with the assumption of "cumulative" motivations. Instead, the pattern is consistent with an alternative view of behavior according to which some salient aspects of the game structure are used to define the game in a particular frame activating a particular set of psychological mechanisms (Messick, 1999; Weber, Kopelman, and Messick, 2004) .
Our data show the existence of reverse reciprocity among the American trustees. They gave less of their endowment (provided by the trust choice of their partner) to their partner in the Trust Game than in the Faith Game in which the endowment is directly provided by the experimenter, not based on the choice of their partner. We suspect that the reverse reciprocity among American trustees may be caused by a reduction in the sense of moral obligation activated in the Trust Game. In the Faith Game, the truster's fate is completely subject to the trustee's (who is a dictator) decision (at least in the eyes of the trustee in the Faith Game).
This makes moral obligation salient to the trustee in the Faith Game. In contrast, trusters in the Trust Game have a means to defend themselves by choosing the safe option of $10. It is their choice and their own responsibility that they gave the trustee the chance to freely divide $30 and received nothing from the trustee in return. The fact that the truster willingly trusts the trustee may thus work as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it enhances the sense of reciprocal obligation and makes the trustee want to reciprocate. On the other hand, it releases the trustee from the moral obligation to be fair since, after all, they could have defended themselves by taking the sure $10, but they did not do so. If they get nothing, it is their responsibility, not mine, they might reason. This self-serving logic leads the trustee to behave in terms of reverse reciprocity.
The effects work in opposite directions. In terms of the reciprocity effect, being trusted makes the trustee more trustworthy to the truster. However, being shown the fact that the truster willingly gave up the opportunity for a sure $10 from the experimenter frees the trustee from the moral obligation to be fair. If this is in fact the case, the comparison of the Trust Game and the Dictator Game does not provide valid conclusions concerning the role of reciprocity in trust and trustworthiness. First, the result may depend on the existence of cues that makes one effect more salient than the other, and, more importantly, the responder's behavior in the Trust Game is not the sum of the two motivations-fairness/altruism and reciprocity. The assumption of the cumulative operation of the two motivations in the Trust Game (an assumption that was shared by previous studies of reciprocity in trust and trustworthiness) may not be a correct representation of the way individuals in these experiments actually make their decisions.
The result that reverse reciprocity was observed only among the American trustees suggests that which effect is dominant partly reflects cultural differences. One explanation for this difference is that the concept of "self-responsibility" seems to be more dominant in the US than in Japan (e.g., Hamilton and Sanders 1983). Thus, subjects behave in a relatively fair manner in the Faith Game in which there is no excuse for taking most of the endowment. In the Trust Game, on the other hand, self-responsibility of the truster can provide an excuse for behaving in a self-interested manner.
Another possible reason why the reverse reciprocity effect only emerged among the American trustees and not among the Japanese trustees comes from Hayashi and her colleagues ' (1999) finding that the Japanese are more strongly motivated by reciprocity than are Americans. They report experimental evidence that Japanese second players cooperate more in a one-shot sequential PD when the first player has already decided to cooperate.
When the first player has decided to defect, practically no Japanese or American second players cooperated. Assuming that the base-rate reciprocity is higher among Japanese trustees than among American trustees, the reverse reciprocity engendered in the Trust Game makes both reciprocity and reverse reciprocity about equal in strength among Japanese trustees.
Among American trustees with a weaker base-rate of reciprocity, the reverse reciprocity effect surpasses the reciprocity effect in strength in the Trust Game. Which of these two possible explanations (or others) are valid requires further research.
Future research should also address why previous findings concerning cross-cultural and gender differences in trust and trustworthiness were not replicated in the current study. Buchan et al.'s (2002) and Kiyonari and Yamagishi's (1999) finding that Americans are more trustful than are the Japanese was partially replicated in the Trust Game in the current study.
Americans trusted the trustee more frequently than did the Japanese in both games, especially in the Trust Game, although the difference did not reach statistical significance. Buchan and her colleagues' and Kiyonari and Yamagishi's findings of no difference in the behavior of the trustee were also replicated, but only in the Faith Game. The trustee's behavior in the Faith Game in this study is consistent with their findings. American and Japanese trustees gave about the same proportion of their endowments to their partners. However, the truster's behavior in the Trust Game is inconsistent with the findings of Buchan and her colleagues' who used a variant of the Trust Game called the Investment Game. Despite the similarity of the game structure, American trustees gave much less than did their Japanese counterparts in our game whereas these two groups of trustees gave about the same proportion of their endowment in Buchan and her colleagues' Investment Game. This difference may be based at least partially on methodological differences between our Trust Game and the Investment Game used by Buchan and her colleagues. In our Trust Game, the choice of the truster is binary, either to get the sure $10 or to entrust $30 to the responder. In the Investment Game, the choice of the truster is continuous and quantitative. She can entrust any amount between $0 and $10. The risk of trusting is greater in our game than in the Investment Game since the choice in our game is binary, thus the truster may earn nothing if he or she chooses to trust the trustee. The greater risk of the truster may make the self-responsibility perception more salient in our game than in the Investment Game. Researchers interested in studying trust and trustworthiness experimentally are advised to be sensitive to subtle variations in the different versions of the Trust Game to be employed.
We began by posing the question of whether trust begets trustworthiness. That is, does the fact that a trustee is trusted induce the former to behave in a more trustworthy manner?
In one-shot interactions with anonymous partners, such as those used in this study, the answer is negative. The act of entrusting some portion of an endowment to someone in a one-time decision does not, by itself, lead to trustworthy behavior on the part of the trustee. This is particularly interesting because repeated interactions in which individuals take risks (such as entrusting another person with an important decision) are essential to trust-building (Blau 1964, Holmes and Rempel 1989; Cook, Yamagishi, Cheshire, Cooper, Masuda, and Mashima, 2004 ). In the one-shot interactions that we examine in this article, there is simply no way for individuals to build trust over time since it is not easy to signal trustworthiness.
However, the use of one-shot games is essential to the investigation of trust and trustworthiness-precisely because we need to enhance our understanding of solitary acts of risk-taking, versus recurrent acts of risk-taking in the formation of trust relations. Under some circumstances it may be difficult for trust relations to emerge at all. Future theory and research must also clarify the specific conditions under which trust begets trustworthiness. 
